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THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
HARMONIZATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATIONS:
PROGRESS OR STAGNATION?
David V. Eakin, M.D.
I. INTRODUCTION
Driven by its own destiny, the European Economic Community, now
the European Union (hereinafter EU),' has sought to harmonize the
regulatory laws of its member nations to "facilitate adoption of a common
position by individual licensing authorities" 2 with respect to drugs. The
project originally began in 1965. This lead to establishment of a timetable
for development of these guidelines originally expected to result in en-
hanced trade throughout the Community by 1985. 3 That goal was not met
nor has complete unification occurred in early 1999 at the time of this
writing.
Seen as a desirable possibility for all major markets, exportation of
the concept was attempted from 1988 onward. This was done through
unilateral contact with Japan in 1988, and sponsorship of a joint confer-
ence including regulatory counterparts from Japan and the United States
in 1989. This resulted in development of the structure for what is now
known as the International Conference on Harmonization of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (here-
inafter ICH).4 At approximately the same time, the governments of sev-
eral European countries and the United States, responding to a variety of
influences, including consumer demands for improved access to new
drugs and stagnation in the pharmaceutical industry, began to push for
I. See generally Dan Kidd, The International Conference on Harmonization of Pharma-
ceutical Regulations, The European Medicines Evaluation Agency, and The FDA: Who's
Zooming Who? 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 183 (1996).
2. See Joseph G. Contrera, Comment, The Food and Drug Administration and The Inter-
national Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious Will International Pharmaceutical
Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 927, 939 (1995) (citing Leigh Hancher, The
European Pharmaceutical Market: Problems of Partial Harmonization, 15 EUR. L. REV. 9,
13 (1990)).
3. See id. at 928 n.3 (citing GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 16, 18, 22, 23 (1993) (noting that the Treaty of Mastricht
changed the name of the European Economic Community to European Union).
4. See id. at 940.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
greater efficiency of the drug approval process. The goal was to accom-
plish regulation for safety and efficacy with less cost and more expedi-
tious access to drugs.' The confluence of these political pressures and
some limited progress in the development of a centralized regulatory
mechanism within the EU resulted in Europe's regional imperative be-
coming a global cause for the three major economic powers: Japan; the
United States; and the European Union.
The long-term goal of the ICH is to coordinate approval of new
drugs to a single common standard developed by negotiation among the
nations involved. It is hoped that this uniformity will cause acceptance of
approvals generated outside any given country and thereby expedite in-
ternational trade in drug products, lower research and development costs
for pharmaceutical companies and eventually lower cost to the consumer.
Currently, the standards and requirements for inspection vary widely. The
U.S. through its regulatory agency, the Federal Drug Administration,
(hereinafter FDA) has developed the most rigorous standards for drug
approval. At times it has appeared less than enthusiastic about any modi-
fication of its programs by harmonization efforts. Several factors, in-
cluding economic limitations within the agency, the substantial increase
in world trade of drug precursors and products and growing political
pressure to participate through linkage with mandatory trade agreements
have caused greater cooperation by the FDA.6
The ICH process for development of Mutual Recognition Agree-
ments (hereinafter MRA) in the area of drug control is now entering its
final trial phase with the clear prospect that some sort of internationalized
regulatory process will result. The lack of enforcement capability of the
central agencies in the system may prove to be an invitation to continued
intervention by member nations. This would prolong the approval process
and add to the inspection burden of manufacturers. Currently, the yearly
cost of FDA inspections alone is estimated at up to three billion dollars.
Considering the conflicting interests of the participants, the outcome
is questionable. The vision of an optimized, universal, regulatory regime
focused on consumer protection and ease of introduction of new drugs
into the world market could be lost to regional distrust and continuing
political barriers to the new system.7 This is the topic of this paper.
5. Kidd, supra note 1, at 184 n.1 (citing Innovative Market Management Means Shooting
Sacred Cows, 926/94 MARKETLETTER available in 1994 WE 2717311; See also 1993 in
Europe - A New Internationalism, 1/10/94 MARKETLETrER available in 1994 WL 2622184
(noting that pressures on the drug industry were without precedent In Europe). Id.
6. See generally note 1. See also Contrera, supra note 2.
7. Special Counsel Ansis Helmanis notes the unusual situation created for the FDA by its
participation in creation of Mutual Resolution Agreements (MRA) which effectively bind the
FDA to a recognition of "equivalence" of regulatory controls and standards of other coun-
tries. These agreements are being developed in a trade negotiations forum rather than a
[Vol. 6:221
PHARMACEUiCAL HARMONIZATION
The slow development of effective centralization of drug approval
within the European Union to present, some thirty years from its con-
ceptual beginnings in 1965, offers a microcosm of difficulties that may be
anticipated with the global effort. With the prospect of a true central
clearing mechanism with authority to bind its members still unrealized in
Europe, questions are raised as to the real prospects for success of the
ICH.' Section I reviews the historical development of the harmonization
process within the European Union.
Section II will evaluate the history of the FDA's development and
the FDA activities directed toward implementation of the ICH goals.
These activities have been impeded by an ambivalent attitude within the
FDA and Congress toward the reliability of such an agreement, as well as
by substantial fiscal restraints.9 Reliance on data from other regulators in
a harmonized arrangement is a tempting goal for the FDA limited by se-
vere fiscal restraints. On the other hand, the American consumer seems
generally unwilling to accept any level of risk.1" Congress, reflecting the
demands of its constituency and the limitations on funding, has also been
ambivalent in its position. Because of this, Congress has intermittently
pushed the FDA to perform redundant testing to insure its standards have
been met contrary to the goals of the ICH. This fact has not gone unno-
ticed in the European Union and accordingly has evoked a general dis-
trust of U.S. motives."1
Section III will explore the divergent interests of the EU, Japan and
United States, the major players in the harmonization process. The po-
tential barriers to the successful conclusion of the International Confer-
ence on Harmonization are explored in detail.
health regulatory arena in which the FDA is accustomed to acting. The process of negotiating
a binding trade agreement, subject to bargaining and trade-offs, is distinctly contrary to the
FDA's usual single minded, authoritarian approach to dealing with quality and efficacy con-
trol issues. See generally The U.S. - EU Mutual Recognition Agreement, 1998 WL 11948481
[hereinafter 6/1/98 GOLDSHEEI].
8. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 184.
9. 6/1/98 GOLDSFIEET (discussing conflicting governmental demands and the limited
ability of the FDA to respond due to a significantly increasing load of imports and inade-
quate fiscal resources).
10. Kidd,supra note 1, at 203.
11. See US. / EU Manufacturing MRA Requires "Confidence Building" - Sauer, 11/30198
PINKSHEET available in 1998 WL 8442447 (discussing the general cynicism of the FDA and
Congress toward the outcome of the procedure) [hereinafter 11/30/98 PINKSHEET].
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II. CENTRALIZATION OF DRUG APPROVAL
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The process of centralization of regulatory approval for drugs was
begun in Europe in 1965 by the publication of Directive 65/65 EEC. 2
Action on the directive was not realized until 1975 when the Committee
for Proprietary Medicinal Products (hereinafter CPMP) with its multistate
procedure was implemented.' 3 Essentially, the CPMP was to function as a
central clearinghouse for drug approvals submitted to any single Euro-
pean State by any one of the twelve member states of the European Eco-
nomic Union. " Once approval was sought in any single state, application
could be made to as many as five states within the Union. Those States
were required to consider the approval in the initial state when conduct-
ing their own reviews. 5 Each state, by retaining broad authority to raise
objections, could decide to reject a drug even though approved by the
initial state of submission. This caused substantial uncertainty and effec-
tively added another layer of approval without any apparent benefit in
expediting market access. Essentially all submissions under this system
resulted in objections that precluded their general approval. 6
Because of the difficulties in the approval process, a new multi-state
procedure, occasionally referred to as "mutual recognition," was imple-
mented by the CPMP in 1975.17 The new system permitted drug compa-
nies to seek approval in a single state by making application to that state
and the CPMP simultaneously. Once approval was obtained, the company
could then apply to additional member states with the appraisal being
forwarded to them.'8 The member states had only ninety days to respond
negatively, with approval being granted unless "there were grounds for
supposing that the medicinal product concerned posed a public health
12. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 188 n.39 (citing Council Directive 65/65 EEC of January
26, 1965 on the Approximation of Provisions Laid. Down by Law, Regulation or Adminis-
trative Action Relating to Proprietary Medicinal Products, 1965 O.J. (22) 269).
13. See Louis H. Orzak et. al., Pharmaceutical Regulation in the European Community:
Barriers to Single Market Integration, 17 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 847, 855 (1992).
14. Member States were not bound by the system and could still apply through the normal
single country procedure for approval in any given state. See Kidd supra note 1, at 189.
Is. See id. at 190.
16. See id. at 190 n.50 (citing a quote from a speech of C.A. Teijgler in The Role of the
CPMP in the EEC, in International Medicines Regulations: a Forward Look to 1992 (S.R.
Walker and J.P. Griffin, eds. (1989)).
17. See id. at 190 n.53 (citing Council Directive 93/39 EEC of 14 June 1993 Amending
Directives 65!65 EEC, 75/318 EEC and 75/319 in Respect of Medicinal Products, 1993 0. J.
(L 214) 22; Richard F. Kinghiam, Esq. et al., The New European Medicines Agency, 49 DRUG
& FOOD L J. 301,309 (1994)).
18. See Orzak, supra note 13, at 857.
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risk."' 9 Mutual distrust, similar to what occurred with the initial system,
occurred under this regime. In the words of the CPMP Chairman, "[flinal
approval has clearly remained with the national bodies."' By 1988, it had
been noted by the CPMP that "there have been objections with regard to
every case dealt with under the Multi-State [sic] procedure."' The com-
mittee further concluded that, "on the whole, the Member States do not
yet accept each other's assessment." '22
The initial thrust toward true centralization of drug evaluation oc-
curred in 1993, at which time the European Agency for Evaluation of
Medicinal Products (EMEA) came into being." The purpose of this
agency is to coordinate the approval, manufacturing and inspection of
medicines between the CPMP and member state's regulatory bodies.24 It
functions only as an advisory body. 5 Since 1995, requests received by
the EMEA have been forwarded to the CPMP for issuance of an opinion
to the European Commission within 210 days. The Commission consults
with its standing committee, the Standing Committee on Medicinal Prod-
ucts for Human Use. 6 An affirmative vote renders the acceptance final. If
the Standing Committee rejects the proposal, the European Council must
act within ninety days or the tendered rejection is automatically overrid-
den, with the CPMP draft decision becoming final.27 The net effect is to
preclude rejection by member states individually as was possible under
the CPMP mechanism prior to 1995.28 This is not a binding regulation
however. Each state's national legislatures cannot be forced to accept the
decision of the European Commission. 9 Thus far, this procedure has been
used only for biotechnology products but is expected to be the de facto
mechanism for other high-tech products.3"
The thirty-year vision of the European Union conceived in 1965, re-
19. See Kidd, supra note 1.
20. See Orzak, supra note 13, at 858.
21. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 190.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 190 n.53.
24. See id. at 192 n.80 (citing Evelyn Friedel & Michael Freundlich, European Commu-
nity Harmonization of the Licensing and Manufacture of Medicinal Products, 49 FOOD &
DRUGS L J. 141, 160 (1994)).
25. See id. at 193.
26. The Commission has a standing committee, the Standing Committee on Medicinal
Products for Human Use, which determines the fate of a proposal submitted by its vote. The
committee is composed of members from all states but votes with a weighted majority. See
id. at 193.
27. See id. at 193.
28. See id. at 193-194.
29. See Orzak, supra note 13, at 859.
30. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 193.
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formulated in 1975, and currently overlaid by the EMEA remains unful-
filled. The inability to bind the member nations continues to be a serious
hindrance. The success of this endeavor, as measured by reduced inspec-
tions or a decrease in time to market, remains subject to the pleasure of
each member state's legislatures.3' The conflicting nationalistic attitudes
delaying formation of the agency, may yet prove a substantial barrier to
its final success.3 2 Viewed in this light, integration into a single, multina-
tional, central control mechanism as proposed by the ICH seems destined
to continue to meet with difficulty if not impossibility as discussed in
section IV.
III. THE FDA, ITS CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE AND
EFFORTS TOWARD INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION
The regulation of food and drugs in the United States of America
began due to problems with drug safety and efficacy.33 The Pure Food
and Drug Act (hereinafter FDA) enacted in 1906, attempted to respond to
those problems but contained many major flaws. 4 In consequence, nu-
merous amendments were enacted over the next thirty years culminating
in the passage of the extensively revised Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act in 1938." A public health disaster with Elixir Sulfanilamide in
1937 prompted enactment of this reform of the food and drug
regulations. 6 The passage of legislation which had been under considera-
tion for some time occurred almost immediately after the disaster. The
resulting federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 was the first leg-
islation to address the safety of drugs. Imported drugs were also included
31. Id. at 191, n.61 (citing No Rubber Stamp From Mutual Recognition, OTC BUSINESS
NEWS, Feb. 28, 1995, available in 1995 WL8375880 [hereinafter 2/28/95 OTC BusINEss
NEWS].
32. 2/28/95 OTC BusINEss NEWS (noting that in 1994, the EMEA director and the Com-
mission pronounced that the member state's national authorities remain the "pillars" of the
system).
33. Contrera, supra note 2, at 933 n.19. The history of federal imported drug regulation
began in the I 800s with an Act regulating Smallpox vaccine. Subsequent to 19 deaths caused
by a Diphtheria antitoxin contaminated with Tetanus bacteria, Congress enacted the Biol-
ogics Law of 1902 requiring licensing of establishments selling in interstate commerce. See
id.
34. See id. at 934, n.22. (citing H.W. SciLriLTz, FOOD LAW IANDBOOK, (1981)).
35. The Sherley Amendment of 1912 was said to be the most important amendment con-
ceming foreign importation. It included misleading or fraudulent claims of efficacy and
benefits of a drug under the category of misbranded or mislabeled. See id.
36. A pediatric preparation of the "new" antibiotic Sulfanilamide was combined with
ethylene glycol, antifreeze, as a solvent and carrier for dosing children. The toxic nature of
antifreeze, previously not known, became clearly evident with the death of eighty seven
children within a few months. See id. at 933, n.26.
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in this legislation for the first time. 7 Subsequent to enactment, approval
on the same basis was required before a drug produced outside the U.S.
could be marketed in the United States.3"
The Thalidomide tragedy in England during the early 1960's
prompted a second, significant overhaul of drug laws under the Kefauver
- Harris Amendments. One of the most important changes was to require
that the efficacy of a drug be demonstrated. This can only be determined
by observation of the drugs effects on target conditions in humans. Ac-
cordingly, requirements for well controlled pre-clinical and clinical trials
were established.39
Recent initiatives in the area of pharmaceutical regulation have been
directed at attacking what appears to be "drug lag" in the approval proc-
ess in the United States.' The President's Council on Competitiveness,
created in 1991, suggested, inter alia, increased reliance on and use of
foreign data.4' Though this would suggest that harmonization would be an
optimal means of achieving the mandated goal, the FDA viewed the idea
with some suspicion. Accordingly, the FDA continued to require sub-
stantiation of efficacy and safety by domestic investigators. This was ac-
complished by incorporating a requirement that any proposed drug be
submitted to at least one domestic clinical trial by an investigator consid-
ered competent by the FDA.42 The FDA justified this position by noting
that:
1. foreign research protocols traditionally are less detailed than American pro-
tocols in terms of judgment and measurement of efficacy,
2. foreign researchers are unaccustomed to being closely monitored through re-
corded data;
3. acclaimed foreign researchers are less amenable to guidance from their spon-
sors;
4. human interpretation of statistical norms and computer programs differ
across cultures;
5. foreign companies do not believe FDA standards are truly necessary; and
6. trial report documents in other countries contain less data than in the United
37. See id. at 935.
38. See id. at 934-935.
39. See id at 935; see also n.35 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (1963) describing provisions for
an expanded process for Investigative New Drug applications).
40. See Michelle D. Miller, The Informed-Consent Policy of the International Conference
on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use: Knowledge is the Best Medicine, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 234 (1997).
(Noting that "drug lag" refers to the amount of time required for the approval process from
conception to actual clinical use).
41. See id. at 235.
42. See id.
19991
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States. 43
As will be noted infra, many feel this stance is being pursued to the pres-
ent time.
During this same time frame, the FDA benefited from passage of the
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992. The increased revenues gener-
ated permitted a substantial increase in enforcement personnel.' Coupled
with the rigorous enforcement policies espoused by the FDA and expan-
sion of regulatory efforts into the offshore bulk, raw material industry, the
reach of the FDA has become increasingly global in direct conflict with
the goals of harmonization. 5 (See discussion infra under MOU's.) The
expansion of FDA regulation into this area of basic component produc-
tion only enhances its global grip on standards, which in turn stifles the
multilateral efforts of the ICH.4
Currently, the FDA is pursuing two paths to maintain oversight on
the drugs utilized by the American populace. Negotiations continue for
implementation of "harmonization" but the major effort has been to de-
velop "Memoranda of Understanding" (hereinafter MOUs) with foreign
countries individually. These permit the FDA to dictate the terms of in-
spections and levels of quality in direct conflict with the announced goals
of harmonization. Perhaps more importantly, this gives access to foreign
sites not easily obtained under MRA's.
The FDA is strongly promoting and insisting on implementation of
its Good Manufacturing Practices (hereinafter GMP)47 for any agreement
reached by the ICH mirroring its efforts with MOUs.' The FDA also
questions some of the clinical practices of foreign practices as noted su-
pra, and in consequence is promoting its "Good Clinical Practices"
[hereinafter GCP] guidelines. The Good Clinical Practices directive is a
proposal for an international ethical and scientific quality standard to be
used exclusively for "designing, conducting, recording, and reporting
trials that involve the participation of human subjects."'49
By its own admission, the FDA is pursuing harmonization as a sec-
ondary effort while maintaining its primary mission of domestic drug
control. This is due primarily to fiscal restraints.' Recently, somewhat
43. Id. at 235.
44. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 196.
45. See id. at 199.
46- See id.
47- See id. at 200.
48- International Conference on Harmonization; Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated
Guideline: Notice of Availability, 62 Fed. Reg. 90, 25,692 (1997) [hereinafter 62 Fed. Reg.
90].
49. Id.
50. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 202 (quoting David Kessler, head of the FDA).
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brighter prognostications are emerging though at least one observer has
commented that it "appeared to the EU at times that what 'MRA' meant
to the U.S. was 'my regulations apply." 5'
The U.S. House Commerce Committee, the oversight committee for
the FDA, has recently raised questions as to the overall effectiveness of
MRAs in light of what they consider to be more stringent FDA require-
ments for safety.5" House testimony by the deputy commissioner of the
FDA, Sharon Smith Holston, indicated, however, that no compromise of
FDA standards was implied by the US entering into the third phase of
implementation of harmonization. She noted that the agency had initially
raised the issue of shared inspections with its European counterparts.,3
Lacking the capacity and funding to inspect foreign companies at the
rate required to maintain safety, she commented that the overall result
would be beneficial in the long run. Commencing in December of 1988,
the final, three year, trial implementation of the Mutual Recognition
Agreement is being evaluated. 4 Holston noted that of the fifteen EU
member states, decisions by the FDA as to acceptability would involve
only two or three of the states with the highest exportation levels. 55 This
is certainly less than a universal appraisal and may provide a basis for
further requests by the FDA for delays. An even less optimistic opinion
was suggested by Ferdinand Sauer, executive director of the European
Medicines Evaluation Agency. During a conference in London in No-
vember 1998, he stated "FDA officials are cynical about the outcome of
the process ..." in referring to the primary responsibility of the U.S. par-
ticipants to develop GMP's."
As noted, implementation of the three year trial is scheduled to begin
in December, 1998. The fear of compromise of safety and efficacy stan-
dards still pervades the U.S. position.57 Some have commented that the
U.S., by participating, is selling-out to the national desire for trade, rather
than reflecting appropriate concern for consumer safety. 8
IV. CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND PROSPECTS
FOR THE SUCCESS OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
51. 6/1/98 GOLDSHEEr, supra note 7.
52. See U.S. House Panel's Fears over EU MRA Inspections, 10/12198 MARKETLETFR
available in 1998 WL 17365974 [hereinafter 10/12/98 MARKELErrER].
53. See id. (Seemingly, this contradicts previous position statements. See supra note 42.)
54. See 1/30/98 PINKSHEET, supra note 11.
55. See id.
56. Id. (quoting Dan Barton (R-Texas) as stating "the pharmaceutical annex was included
at the insistence of the Europeans and appears to open few doors for increased American
pharmaceuticals in Europe." Id).
57. See 10/12/98 MARKETLETERsupra note 52.
58. See id.
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The European harmonization system has continually suffered from
the lack of a central enforcement authority empowered to impose its ac-
tions upon member countries. The same appears to be the Achilles' Heel
of the ICH in developing the MRA. The individual country's legislatures
continue to have final control of implementation with the attendant politi-
cal uncertainties.59 Without enforcement procedures built into the central
system to assure compliance, member countries retain a potential "veto"
which in turn jeopardizes the entire system.
This is particularly applicable to the U.S. where ambivalence, both
by the legislature and the FDA, seems to be the rule. The U.S., not con-
tent to rely on what it may feel are unsubstantiated and uncontrolled for-
eign clinical and manufacturing practices, may well continue to develop
MOUs.' ° As noted, MOUs permit the FDA to impose its more stringent
standards on foreign countries and also serve to provide authorization for
foreign inspections.61 Effectively, this adds another layer of inspection
which potentially slows the overall process through unnecessary redun-
dancy. The result negates the purpose of harmonization. 2 Other barriers
to implementation of the Mutual Recognition Agreement for pharmaceu-
ticals are discussed below.
A. Ethnic and Cultural Barriers
Ethnic and cultural differences are reflected in differing attitudes to-
ward health, medicine and doctors generally. They pose a major obstacle
to successful development of pharmaceutical standards, particularly in the
conduct of clinical trials. 3 Miller, in an extensive presentation of differ-
ing approaches to informed consent, comments that the "paternalism" of
Japanese investigators and the tendency in the EU to favor medical prog-
ress over fully informed consent raise "troubling issues."'
There have been eleven major drug disasters in Japan over the last
forty years resulting in the deaths of several hundred people and exposure
to risk of up to 20,000 people. 65 Multiple factors appear to be involved
including:
1. a 'paternalistic' attitude of Japanese physicians toward informed consent
with many patients not being told that they have been placed on an experimen-
59. Conterera, supra note 2, at 954-955.
60. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 200.
61. See id. at 202.
62. 6/1/98 GOLDSHEET supra note 51 (discussing generally the pressures facing the FDA).
63. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 203.
64. Miller, supra note 40, at 234, 227.
65. See id. at 222. Japanese physicians have substantial discretion in choosing to treat
hospitalized patients with experimental drugs without their knowledge or consent.
230 [Vol. 6:221
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tal drug;
2. the ability of drug companies to suppress unfavorable data without signifi-
cant penalty, and
3. the overriding profit motive.6
Yet another factor impacting upon the drug disasters in Japan is the
$2,600 reimbursement paid to the hospitals for each case. 7 Kickbacks to
meagerly reimbursed doctors are also the rule. One estimate suggests that
upwards of 20 billion dollars per year is dispensed in this manner.' This
is rather interesting considering that Japan appears to be slated to oversee
the efficacy standards for drug testing.' This undoubtedly explains the
U.S. insistence on acceptance of the Good Clinical Practice standards
which include incorporation of the Helsinki agreement on informed con-
sent.70
Informed consent became an issue in Japan after the Sorivudine cri-
sis in the 1980's. Sorivudine, an anti-viral drug that had previously been
rejected in Europe as too dangerous but was marketed in Japan by Nip-
pon Shoji, hoped to increase the value of its shares in a forthcoming stock
issue.7" The drug resulted in eight deaths within three weeks, as well as
severe, chronic effects in those who survived.72
Consumer groups demanded reform of the consent practices. The re-
suiting guidelines only suggested written documentation and did not
modify the physician's discretionary ability to place patients on experi-
mental drugs without full informed consent.73 A more recent incident
with Irinotecan, an anti-cancer agent, has caused renewed efforts to im-
prove the informed consent of patients in trials and to require written con-
firmation of receipt of informed consent.74
Even with the renewed initiative, only approximately fifty percent of
Japanese doctors believe that it is necessary to obtain written consent.7
Perhaps more importantly, doctors still describe informed consent as a
"doctor's explanation" and a "patient's consent."76 This stands at the op-
66. See id. at 222-224.
67. Id. at 222 n. 150 (quoting a Sydney Morning Herald article from July 1994).
68. See id. at 240.
69. See Jill Weschler, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, (6/1/1998) available in 1998 WL
13270667 [hereinafter PHARMEXEC].
70. See 62 FED. REG. 90 supra note 48, at 25692.
71. See Miller, supra note 40, at 223.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 225.
74. See id at 226 n. 196 (quoting an official of the Japanese Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau
as reported in COMLINE DAILY NEWS BIOTECH AND MED. TECH. (11/14/1994)).
75. See id. at n. 200 (quoting a poll done by COMLINE (09/12/1995)).
76. See id at 226 n.201 (quoting an article from the Daily Yorniuri 12/5/1992 reflecting
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posite end of the spectrum from the U.S. that emphasizes self-
determination as the paramount consideration for adequate informed con-
sent." Accordingly, if the ICH standard of the informed consent reflects
this diminished standard, there will be a direct conflict with established
case law in the U.S. protecting patient rights."
Other ethnic factors affecting acceptability of foreign data involve
those which are culturally driven such as: diet; smoking habits; use of
alcohol; exposure to pollution; amount of daily sunshine; socioeconomic
status; and compliance with prescribed drug regimens.79 These elements
are particularly crucial to determinations of drug equivalence, as well as
efficacy.'0 Intrinsic ethnic factors impacting on equivalence include: ge-
netic polymorphism; average age; gender; height; weight; lean body
mass; body composition; and organ dysfunction." An additional factor
that has been of great importance in Japan has been the co-use of other
drugs." According to Miller, the Japanese take twice as much medica-
tions as Americans, as evidenced by approximately $80 billion that are
expended yearly. This has resulted in a derisive phrase for the Japanese,
"kusuri zuke shaki," which translates to "drug-pickled society."83 The
potential for uncertainty and conflicting results from this fact alone is of
considerable concern.
B. Political Barriers
Political barriers also pose a potential problem. Legislatures retain
the final ability to approve or reject standards, as well as the capacity to
change requirements at any time. This is potentially disruptive 4 of the
entire system. 5 Several authors have noted the close relationship of drug
regulatory activities and public policy in any given country. 6 Ceding this
control to a central agency would prove essentially unworkable for many
states which view regulation of drugs as synonymous with national sov-
the statement by Masao Onishi that doctors "arrogantly dispense what ever treatment he
deems best").
77. See id. at 227.
78 See id.
79. See generally, International Conference on Harmonization; Guidance on Ethnic Fac-
tors in Acceptability of Foreign Clinical Data 63 FED. REG. 31,790 (1998).
80. See id. at 31,794 (defining equivalence as the extrapolated response to drugs from the
standpoint of safety, efficacy, and dose-response).
81. See id.
82. See Miller, supra note 40, at 239-240.
83. Id.
84. See Orzak, supra note 13, at 865.
85. Contrera, supra note 2, at 954-955.
86. See generally Orzak, supra note 13 (noting the conflicts between a single nationalized
or internationalized system and a regulatory body controlled locally).
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ereignty" Given the strong relationship of culture and society to ideas
concerning public health, drug control remains essentially a political en-
tity.8 A prime example may be the FDA which remains essentially a
creature of Congress, subject to the political whims and shifting positions
of special interest groups ."
In large part, this conflict has led to the structuring of the ICH with-
out any central enforcement capabilities. 9 The FDA seemingly views
this defect as an invitation for it to attempt to fulfill an oversight function
within the international community through continued development of
MOU's with individual countries. As noted, this permits foreign access
that is otherwise not available under the MRA without first seeking per-
mission." This approach is entirely contrary to the express goals of the
ICH.
The approach of the FDA conflicts with the directive of the General
Accounting Office (hereinafter GAO) which has proposed cooperative
acceptance of "foreign" inspection and approval data.92 The FDA's goal
should be "to 're-examine and revise' its foreign inspection strategy to
provide adequate assurance that all foreign manufacturers exporting ap-
proved pharmaceutical products to the U.S. comply with U.S.
standards." 93 At a minimum, the major strategic initiatives should include,
"(1). timely follow-up inspections of all foreign manufacturers that have
been identified as having serious manufacturing deficiencies and that
have promised to take corrective action; and (2). periodic surveillance
inspections of all foreign manufacturers, not just high risk manufactur-
ers."
94
The key concern of the GAO was timeliness. According to the GAO,
sixty percent of the reports submitted by foreign inspection agencies were
later than those called for by agency standards. That included fifty per-
cent regarding companies with the most serious deficiencies. In addition
the FDA response time to this notice was almost four times as long as
normally provided.95 The clear implication of these observations was that
the FDA may be compromising its own standards to accommodate har-
monization.
The industry has expressed fear that, with the uncertainties of a har-
87. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 203.
89. See id.
89. See 6/1/98 GOLDSHEET, supra note 7; 11/30198 PINKSHEET, supra note 11, Oct. 12,
1998 MARKETLETTER, supra note 52.
90. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 194-195.
91. See id. at 200.
92. See 6/1/98 GOLDSHEEr, supra note 7.
93. Id.
94- Id. (citing the final GAO report of April 1998).
95. See id.
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monized, regularized system, more rather than less inspection burden
may result" A Glaxo Wellcome executive framed the transition period in
the following terms: "[t]he transition period itself gives a lot of worry to
industry, because we see it being a time when there can be a substantial
escalation of standards for no real benefit. There can be periods of over
regulation, there can be increased regulator activity."'97 This Glaxo Well-
come executive further stated that "over-regulation" may potentially lead
to "technology block."98
C. Criminal Activities
Criminal activities have become an increasing problem with third
world countries entering the drug supply chain. This activity is evidenced
by a recent incident in Haiti in which eighty-nine children were poisoned
by glycerin containing ethylene glycol,' an event strikingly similar to the
Sulfanilamide disaster in the U.S. leading to the Harris-Kefauver
Amendments." Eli Lilly & Company have identified five types of crimi-
nal activity which should be guarded against:
1. Unproved generics;
2. Product diversion;
3. Counterfeit Labels;
4. Counterfeit API's (active ingredients); and
5. Counterfeit drug products.'0 '
Frequently, counterfeit drugs are placed into the system by India and
China and are made to resemble the "copied" drug. Most commonly,
counterfeits appear during the legal transition of protected drugs to ge-
nerics. The sellers often escape detection by claiming that a marketing
application is pending with the FDA. The lack of investigation and prose-
cution in some countries makes it impossible to stop such activity. Addi-
tionally, the FDA and U.S. government do not have an integrated plan for
enforcing prohibitions against such activity, which has resulted in many
counterfeit drugs escaping detection until they reach the consumer
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Sulfanilamide was one of the first antibiotics manufactured in the U.S. S.E. Massen-
gill, looking to bring the product onto the market for children, utilized ethylene glycol ( i.e.,
antifreeze, not known to be toxic at that time) as a solvent to create a syrup. Eighty-seven
children died from the use of this drug. See id. at 934, n.26.
100. The Kefauver-Harris Amendments required that a new drug had to be safe and "effec-
tive." They also promulgated new standards for clinical trials with emphasis on efficacy and
safety. See Contrera, supra note 2, at 934 n.35.
101. 6f1/98 GOLDSHEET, supra note 7.
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A similar situation exists with what is known as "parallel importa-
tion" or "U-boat" sales.103 "Parallel importation" or "U-boat" sales occurs
with diversion of products obtained by countries which are able to nego-
tiate the most favorable rates from the manufacturer. Here, the result is to
defraud the manufacturers by re-importing their own products, which are
then sold on the open market at a substantial discount and profit to the
"importers". The EU countries currently have no policies precluding this
activity which contributes to the problem."°
Counterfeit active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) obtained in bulk
from foreign importers also pose a substantial threat to the manufacturers
of generic drugs. This problem is occurring frequently due to the sub-
stantial profits that can be realized from such transactions. The magnitude
of counterfeiting has increased notably in recent years with as much as
forty to sixty percent of the drugs sold in Malaysia being counterfeit,
twenty-five percent in Mexico and perhaps seven percent in the U.S."
D. Trade Agreements Versus Regulatory Controls
Another troublesome feature of the overall process is that it is inex-
tricably tied to trade negotiations." This seriously limits the FDA's abil-
ity to impose what many feel and acknowledge are higher standards than
those being proposed for the Mutual Recognition Agreements.' 7 Some
observers have noted that the disparity in national goals may cause some
to push for "downward" harmonization to promote freer trade rather than
"upward" harmonization which would guarantee greater levels of protec-
tion to consumers worldwide. 08 In the U.S. there exists essentially no
tolerance for diminished protection, contrary to third world countries
which are accustomed to limited, or no protection by their governments.
Any perceived diminution in standards could pose serious political and
legal conflicts."°9 The latter derives from the fact that no recourse to the
legal system is created for injuries sustained during, or as a result of,
flawed preliminary studies."' In part, this is due to the rather severe
limitations placed on establishment of standing". to sue by cases such as
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id. (citing director William Grosse of Eli Lilly & Co.).
106. See id. 10/12/98 MARKETLETTER, supra, note 52.
107. See id.
108. Kidd, supra note 1, at 195.
109. See 6/1/98 GOLDSHEET supra note 7.
110. Miller, supra note 40, at 234-237.
111. See id. at 237-238 (established that standing for beneficiaries of an agency action is
directly dependent on a showing of that beneficiary's direct relationship to the challenged
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife."'
The participation of the FDA in the trade negotiations, which form
an umbrella over the ICH endeavor, is only a limited part of more in-
volved discussions and agreements. Generally, the negotiations are part
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and also under a
section of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Additionally, the FDA has
participated in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations in an attempt to further
facilitate international trade." 3 The resulting effect has been to subordi-
nate normal regulatory goals to the creation of more freely accessible
trade exchanges." 4 Under the most recent TBT agreements, each country
may maintain control of its definitional standards, but once it has agreed
to common international standards, it is bound to the latter with severely
restricted latitude to act on its own.' Similar procedures and arrange-
ments are standard for NAFIA and WTO agreements as well." 6
Accordingly, the FDA and U.S. Congress, normally accustomed to
much greater control, are potentially subjugated to the will of the interna-
tional community. This situation has led some congressional members of
the House Oversight Committee to comment that "trade pressures may be
trying to outpace health and safety issues in the agreement.' '17 In turn,
this emboldens the FDA to demand further access for its own inspections,
which partially defeats the entire intent of the agreements (reduction of
the overall number of inspections by recognition of foreign regulatory
control mechanisms). This contradiction is noted by Weschler who
quoted the deputy director of Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Roger Williams, as stating that, "FDA reviewers need 'strong' justifica-
tion and supervisory concurrence to deviate from ICH standards. The
guidelines should provide a 'ceiling' for what data reviewers may re-
quest, and not a 'floor' subject to additional requirements in each
region.""18
Kidd comments that recent congressional approval of increased en-
forcement initiatives and the extension of the Drug User Fee Act for five
years conflicts directly with ICH initiatives and may suggest future
action).
12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 55 (1992). (established that standing for
beneficiaries of an agency action is directly dependent on a showing of that beneficiary's
direct relationship to the challenged action).
113. See International Harmonization; Policy on Standards: Notice, 60 FED. REG. 53077,
53079 (1995) [hereinafter 60 FED. REG.].
114. 10112/1998, MARKETLETTER, supra note 52.
115. See 60 FED.REG., supra note 48, at 53079.
116. See id.
117. 10/12/1998 MARKETLETTER, supra note 52.
118. Wechsler, supra note 70.
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problems with the incorporation of ICH standards.119 The increased
funding from the Drug User Fee Act also helps to diminish the effect of
fiscal restraints which, according to Holston, is the major factor pushing
the FDA toward compliance.1"e The binding character of these trade
agreements and the potential exclusion of the U.S. from a forty billion
dollar market would seem to be a strong disincentive tending to contra-
dict Kidd's hypothesis."'
Foreign observers have noted these ambivalent and sometimes con-
tradictory positions of Congress and the FDA. Commenting on a speech
by FDA International Policy Director Linda Horton, Special Council An-
sis Helmanis made the following observations:
1. the FDA historically has been accustomed to entering into non-binding
MOUs as opposed to the binding character of trade pacts;
2. the MOUs were voluntarily negotiated between health authorities rather
than being subject to the politics of trade agreements where trade-offs are
the rule, rather than the rare exception; and
3. MRAs are binding trade pacts and thus withdrawal is not an option for the
FDA.
1 2
Congress, which ultimately dictates much of the FDA policy, is wary of
the potential negative effects of ceding a large measure of control to a
foreign entity. It has demonstrated this concern by its ambivalence toward
the ICH.23
E. Patent Laws
According to Kidd, there is "strong evidence that the vitality of any
modem health care system is directly dependent upon a strong intellec-
tual property regime. ' Currently, patent laws vary substantially world-
wide with little apparent potential for a harmonized intellectual property
119. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 197.
120. See 10112/98 MARKETLETrER, supra note 52.
121. See 611/98 GOLDSHEET, supra note 7.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Kidd, supra note 1, at 205 n.176. An example of problems arising from limited pro-
tection are noted in India's recent failure to pass modifying legislation in this area. Although
plagued by epidemics of easily treatable diseases, India is currently avoided by most drug
manufacturers due to poor patent protection. See Indian Industry Seminar Discusses Patents,
MARKErLETTER, May 22, 1995 available at 1995 WL 2152963 [hereinafter 5/22/1995
MARKErLETtER]; A similar situation existed in China even though it represented 22% of the
world population; U.S. Industry Welcomes China Trade Treaty, MARKETLETTER, March 6,
1995 available at 1995 WL2151973. [hereinafter 3/6/1995 MARKETLETTER].
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system."z Sabetelli and Rasser feel this is due to:
1. [t]he reluctance of national governments to give up their current systems
which allow them to use their patent laws to favor domestic entrepreneurs;
2. [t]he relinquishment of a portion of national sovereignty for the sake of a
global system; and
3. [t]he reconciliation of the different national interests of the developing
countries (i.e., the Third World) and the developed countries. 126
The authors further note that it is essentially these same three core is-
sues which have and will prove to be significant impediments to interna-
tional harmonization in many areas of endeavor. 27
A major stumbling block in the area of patents is the U.S.'s resis-
tance to adoption of a "first to file" system for patent recognition.'2 The
"first to file system" is the de facto international standard in contrast to
the "first to invent" system used and supported by some 200 years of case
law in the U.S." Admittedly, a change would require statutory amend-
ment of a firmly entrenched system. However, as pointed out by the
authors, most U.S. companies doing business internationally are currently
working under the "first to file" system without difficulty."' The U.S.
position on this aspect of harmonization is strikingly similar to the FDA's
insistence on negotiating individual MOUs, "my rules apply" as noted
above
Other significant obstacles also exist which have been the subject of
continuing negotiation during eight rounds of the GATT extending ove-
forty-eight years. The recent resistance of India to implementation of
stronger intellectual property laws is one example.' The other areas of
dispute are:
1. automatic publication of all patent applications 18 months after filing (not
125. See Anthony D Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmoni-
zation, 22 N. Ky. L REV. 579-580 (t995).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 581.
128. Id.
129. The authors note that the U.S. and Philippines are the only countries to adopt the "first
to invent" system. (citing Lee J. Schroeder, The Harmonization of Patent Laws, C576 A.L.I.
473, 475 (1990). See id. at 587 n.27.
130. Id. at 606.
131. India's need for a strong intellectual property rights regime was discussed by Richard
Arnold of the International Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association at a seminar on the
topic in New Delhi in 1995. The Parliament's failure to pass such legislation caused India to
be placed on a *'priority watch list" by America's trade representative, Mickey Kantor.
5/22/95 MARKETLEMTER, supra note 124.
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currently done in the U.S.);
2. granting prior user rights to those in possession of an invention at the time of
filing by another,
3. recognition of non-published foreign prior art as a statutory bar to patent-
ability,
4. adoption of the filing date as the effective date of a foreign patent application
for prior art purposes;
5. granting of interim patent protection; and
6. adoption of a uniform term of patent protection.
132
Complicating all of these issues is the heavy involvement of third world
nations in the negotiation process with demands for recognizing "special
needs." The recent acquiescence of China to stronger enforcement of
trademark and patent rights is viewed with skepticism due to its wish not
to be excluded from the WTO. '33 Considerable hostility to GATT exists
within the U.S. Because of this hostility, prompt resolution of these issues
does not seem imminent 4
F. Regulatory Creep
Kidd also notes that "mission creep" endangers the entire process. 3'
Other subjects for harmonization have been inserted into the framework
of the Mutual Recognition Agreements that tend to complicate the entire
process. 36 Rather than concentrating on issues uniquely associated with
control of production and quality of drugs, standards for such diverse
things as watercraft, lawnmowers and electromagnetic radiation are also
being developed under the general umbrella of the MRA."3' Though con-
sumer safety is a common thread, the means and methods of defining and
insuring it vastly differ, thereby limiting the potential for optimal resolu-
tion of issues specific to drugs. 138
132. Id. at 605.
133. China, on the other hand, agreed to a U.S. China trade treaty which included stronger
enforcement of patent and trademark rights. Many felt their agreement was only due to the
prospect of exclusion from the World Trade Organization and consequently are taking a wait
and see attitude. See 3/6/1995 MARKETLETTER, supra note 128.
134. Id.
135. Kidd, supra note 1, at 205 n.179 (defining mission creep as expansion of original
objectives to include less focused and less realistic goals).
136. AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, www.iep.doc.gov/mra/mra.htm (including telecommum-
cation equipment, electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft and
medical devices as Sectorial Annexes to the Mutual Recognition Agreement).
137. See 6/1/1998 GOLDSHEET, supra note 7.
138. See id.
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G. Problems with Fast Track Drug Approval in the U.S. and Canada
Recently, the FDA has shown a more conciliatory attitude toward the
ICH concept.139 A similar concept was supported by the Bush White
House in 1990. President Bush, continuing the original limited reforms
initiated by President Carter, mandated that faster approvals of new drugs
should be sought by several measures." These suggested measures in
relevant part were:
1. use of external review;
2. expanded use of advisory committees;
3. an expanded roll for Institutional Review Boards;
4. flexible interpretation of the efficacy standard;
5. accelerated approval;
6. Expanded use of foreign data and recognition of foreign approvals ...; and
7. direction of staff and financial resources toward new drug reviews.
1 41
As previously noted, the FDA has intermittently resisted such a
change in policy. This was particularly evident under the leadership of
Kessler whose policies emphasized increased enforcement and expansion
of FDA investigative activities. 42 Inclusion of new areas such as bulk
ingredient producers and foreign operations occurred during his regime
by the use of MOUs 43
Under continued pressure from consumer groups and politicians, the
FDA has finally embarked upon the proposed new task domestically."
With the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization
and Accountability Act of 1997, the Clinton administration has nudged
the FDA into expediting consumer access by placing some drugs on fast
track approval. The key element has been the re-authorization of the User
Fee Act which provides funding and allows for outside expert reviews. 145
Countering assertions of diminished safety, people inside the agency note
that the FDA retains substantial discretion.'4
In an attempt to dispel the asserted need for the FDA's retention of
control, Mark E. Grayson, assistant VP of the industry group at the Phar-
139. See Miller, supra note 40, at 228 (citing more rapid. access and decreased cost to con-
sumers as the two major goals of harmonization).
140. See id. at 234 n.261 (citing Recommendations to Speed Drug Approvals Issued [1990-
91 Transfer Binder], FOOD DRUG CosM. L REP. (CCH) p.42,603 at 43617).
141. Id.
142. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 199-202.
143. See id.
144. Thoroughly Modern, 1/1/1998 MEDANEWS 1, available in 1998 WL 10478901 [here-
inafter 1/1/98 MEDANEWS].
145. See id.
146. See id.
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maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, has stated that "I
don't think the approval process can get too fast," while simultaneously
defending the 1997-1998 American Home Products disaster with the
weight loss drug Redux. 7 Considering the significant number of deaths
resulting from tricuspid valve (TV) damage, the resultant pulmonary hy-
pertension, and more importantly, the large number of patients with now
asymptomatic TV damage (whose outcome is currently unknown), this
seems a rather self-serving remark by an industry driven mostly by profit
motive.1" Michael A. Friedman's prognostication that with faster market
access, manufactures should show a profit gain of four percent domesti-
cally from 1997 to 1998, and eight percent for foreign based companies,
also seems to support this conclusion. 49
The significance of the overriding profit motive is further substanti-
ated by an article in the Globe and Mail, by authors Krista Foss and Paul
Taylor, which illustrates "the uneasy tango between pharmaceutical com-
panies and the academics they use to test their drugs.""15 Dr. Olivieri, a
researcher at Toronto's Hospital for Sick Children, has been threatened
with legal action by a pharmaceutical manufacturer for attempting to
publish negative findings with regard to their drug. The authors note that
"when the profit motive takes precedence over scientific rigor - or worse,
patient's safety - that researchers are compromised.""15 The authors,
quoting Martin Schecter, National Director of the Canadian HIV Trials
Network, further note that "[w]hen corporate interests are funding re-
search, often they have an agenda for what that research will show and
how it will help their corporate endeavors." '152
Citing costs for an upcoming trial of the heart drug Fradifiban, Foss
and Taylor also emphasize that Canadian Universities and hospitals are to
receive approximately $5 million dollars. Physicians involved will be
paid up to $10,000 per patient - this amount sometimes exceeds $20,000.
Additionally, the testing firm will pay the hospital $25,000 to "cover
costs of light, heat, and electricity used by each patient while hospital-
ized." By playing "ball" with the manufacturers by not publishing nega-
tive results, researchers, hospitals and universities stand to reap a sub-
stantial, continuing benefit.1 53
In a similar incident, Dr. Betty Dong, a researcher at the University
147. See id.
148. Personal opinion of the author.
149. See 1/1/1998 MEDADNEWS, supra note 144.
150. Krista Foss & Paul Taylor, Volatile Mix Meant Trouble at Sick Kid's Hospital, Revolt
Illustrates the Potential Danger of Marrying Profit and Scientific Research 812211998
GLOBE & MAIL (TORON-ro CAN.) Al [hereinafter 1/1/98 GLOBE & MAIL].
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
1999l
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
of California at San Francisco, sought to publish negative results on the
relative efficacy of Synthroid versus a cheaper generic substitute. After
seven years (four under threat of legal action that culminated in her being
dropped by the university), and with the support of the FDA, she was able
to publish the results in the Journal of the American Medical Association.
In a similarly unfortunate situation, researcher David Kern, MD., founder
of the occupational and environmental health services at Memorial Hos-
pital of Pawtucket, R.I. and Brown University, lost both appointments
one week after publishing a negative report as to incidence of lung dis-
ease in a local textile manufacturing plant, Microfibres, Inc. This termi-
nated ten years of service to both entities.
Foss and Taylor acknowledge that these cases are only three among
perhaps thousands where research is being carried on without problem. 154
They do cite other statistics that evoke the same sense of possible con-
flict.
1. In the U.S., medical research is funded annually in the overall amount of $30
billion dollars. $16 billion dollars comes from private industry sources. With
public funding of universities and hospitals diminishing due to budget con-
straints, some observers predict a potential for increasing control of the dis-
persion of results by drug companies.
2. A Carnegie Mellon study has recently shown that thirty-five percent of re-
search agreements allow the sponsor to delete information from the report,
fifty-three percent permit delays in publication.
3. A recent survey of 2000 members of science facilities by Harvard Medical
School showed that forty-three percent had received some sort of a gift from
pharmaceutical companies in the last three years.
4. Researcher self interest is also a potential problem. Recently, a researcher
publishing a favorable report failed to mention that he held a patent on the
product. 155
With diminishing reimbursement for patient care, many hospitals may
seek to increase their revenues by attracting more drug trials or restruc-
turing to develop an operation supportive of and conducive to entering
into this lucrative field.'56 One such example is the Children's Hospital in
Columbus, Ohio. Though portrayed by the Children's Hospital as "good
for pediatricians, good for kids, good for pharmaceutical companies and
good for the FDA," the real "good" of the proposed project to increase
access to clinical studies would appear to be on the bottom line.157
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Children's Hospital Hopes to Win More Clinical Trials, 9/16/98 COLUMBUS DISPATCH
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When considered in the light of alternatives which have included
hospital closings, physician bankruptcies, and interpolation of third party
payers into the costs of hospital operation, it is of no wonder that hospi-
tals are looking to more secure sources of income. Equally anticipated
may be results as described above with researchers Oliveri, Kern and
Dong. Such propensities make ceding of FDA control to a remote foreign
entity with no personal stake in the outcome, nor possibility of legal ac-
countability becomes a rather tenuous proposition.
The lack of direct accountability might lead to a situation as experi-
enced in Japan with the Sourivudine crisis where two of the three deaths
were kept secret because, as a former executive explained, "' [ilt is normal
(in the pharmaceutical industry) to close your eyes to bad data ... it
would be a big problem if a drug which cost billions of yen to develop
were not approved."""
V. SUMMARY
International control of drug approval and evaluation appears to run
counter to the long-standing political interest of individual countries. 59
As noted, health policy is inextricably tied to cultural and societal values
in any given society and as such has always been subject to intense politi-
cizing by regional and national governments."6 In developing countries,
the primary goal may be to provide drug access regardless of efficacy and
safety. The production of drugs and active primary ingredients is ex-
tremely profitable if removed from the constraints of scrupulous and rig-
orous testing .This may provide additional impetus for limited scrutiny in
cash poor countries.
The thrust of U.S. drug policy is diametrically opposed to such a
philosophy. The American consumer has essentially no tolerance for risk
with respect to drugs, and in consequence the FDA has developed and
continues to pursue inordinately high standards."" The EU countries tend
to pursue a middle ground giving individual investigators substantial dis-
cretionary control of clinical trials."6 These divergent ideas regarding
informed consent, medical practice, and health issues also pose serious
(OHIO) 05C available in 1998 WL 16493856 (noting the hospitals scramble to be included in
newly funded pediatric drug trials).
158. Miller, supra note 40, at 223 n.156 (quoting a former Nippon Shoji executive as re-
ported by Ben Hills, Japan: Prescription for Disaster, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 30,
1994).
159. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 203.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Miller, supra note 40, at 228-235. (Discussing varying standards in the context of
vastly different requirements for informed consent in the U.S., EU, and Japan).
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problems for development of a common regulatory scheme.
In the economic sphere, increasing criminal activity, the substantial
variation in patent laws worldwide and the subjugation of drug control
issues to trade interests, all stand to complicate development of a unified
agreement. The lack of laws in the EU regarding re-importation of drug
products tends to facilitate introduction of counterfeit drugs into com-
merce.'" This potentially dangerous situation has not yet been dealt with
adequately and has required the FDA to incur increased monitoring
costs.1"
The lack of consistent patent laws coupled with lack of enforcement
of intellectual property rights discourages many manufacturers, both in
the U.S. and EU, from expanding their marketing. Overall, this will limit
the reach of the MRA.165
The negotiation of regulatory controls within the framework of gen-
eral trade agreements may lead to undesired and unintended results. The
binding character of trade agreements precludes withdrawal as an option
to remedy results which might prove unacceptable vis a vis FDA stan-
dards.166
Lastly, the potential for the system to be subverted by exploitation of
the economic inequities between countries by diversion of manufacturing
to countries with lower wage standards or more permissive approval pro-
cedures looms large as a potential problem. 67 The magnitude of return
from increasing market share in the world economy is a strong stimulus
to find and utilize potential legal loopholes which surely will surface as
harmonization progresses. The resulting disruption of an already stressed
U.S. health care system by loss of substantial revenues from testing could
prove disastrous to medical training which is funded to a great extent by
such research grants. With the continuing decline in available funding for
health care, the long-term result might be restricted consumer access to
the health system with limited options available to those entering the
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
There have been some suggestions of progress in movement towards
global harmonization." a Others have been less optimistic noting that the
163. See 6/1/98 GOLDSHEET, supra note 7.
164. See id.
165. See generally, Sabatelli, supra note 125.
166. See 6/1/98 GOLDSHEET, supra note 7.
167. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective On Current Regulatory Reforms: Re-
jection, Relocation, or Reinvention? 2 IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 432 (1995).
168. See EMEA 1997 Report: Transition Period Ends, 1/19/1998 MARKETLETTER available
in 1998 WL 9220245 (commenting on evaluation of 197 applications by the EMEA in 1997).
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diverse factors impacting on the development of a harmonized, interna-
tional system for drug approval suggest that the end result will somewhat
less than the single, controlling entity envisioned by the founders." The
results of the effort within the EU will begin to be apparent in 1999.
Those results should extrapolate well to the international effort and thus
will continue to forecast the problems and results of the combined efforts
of the EU, U.S., and Japan.
Realistically, it seems probable that the individual countries will re-
tain ultimate veto power with regard to approval of any single drug or
drug product. The real issue is how much will this increase the "dead
weight" of regulatory inspections on the international drug industry. 0 If
this can be minimized to any extent, the result might be more ready ac-
cess to drugs in international commerce but with no concomitant lower-
ing of price. On the other hand, if the FDA and Congress continue to
view "foreign" efforts with suspicion or distrust, the result would be the
opposite - prolongation of approval times, increased costs to the con-
sumer and greater regulatory burden on the drug industry. Economic
limitations on governments worldwide are perhaps the trump card in the
harmonization effort which will produce a more harmonized, efficient
and safe international control mechanism ultimately.
See also, ICH: Phase II Harmonization Begins, 2J23/1998 MARKETLErTER available in 1998
WL 9220534 (noting that two new guidelines are to be implemented, Ethnic Factors in the
Acceptability of Foreign Clinical Data and Statistical Principles for Clinical Trials which
"-will minimize the need to duplicate clinical studies while insuring that safeguards are
maintained").
169. See Kidd, supra note 1, at 204.
170. Id. at 206.
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